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Abstract
Background: Before 1991, the infectious diseases surveillance systems (IDSS) of the former
Soviet Union (FSU) were centrally planned in Moscow. The dissolution of the FSU resulted in
economic stresses on public health infrastructure. At the request of seven FSU Ministries of Health,
we performed assessments of the IDSS designed to guide reform. The assessment of the Armenian
infectious diseases surveillance system (AIDSS) is presented here as a prototype.
Discussion: We performed qualitative assessments using the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) guidelines for evaluating surveillance systems. Until 1996, the AIDSS collected
aggregate and case-based data on 64 infectious diseases. It collected information on diseases of low
pathogenicity (e.g., pediculosis) and those with no public health intervention (e.g., infectious
mononucleosis). The specificity was poor because of the lack of case definitions. Most cases were
investigated using a lengthy, non-disease-specific case-report form Armenian public health officials
analyzed data descriptively and reported data upward from the local to national level, with little
feedback. Information was not shared across vertical programs. Reform should focus on enhancing
usefulness, efficiency, and effectiveness by reducing the quantity of data collected and revising
reporting procedures and information types; improving the quality, analyses, and use of data at
different levels; reducing system operations costs; and improving communications to reporting
sources. These recommendations are generalizable to other FSU republics.
Summary:  The AIDSS was complex and sensitive, yet costly and inefficient. The flexibility,
representativeness, and timeliness were good because of a comprehensive health-care system and
compulsory reporting. Some data were questionable and some had no utility.
Background
Health information systems (HIS) provide a scientific and
technological framework to gather, manage, and interpret
data to inform the public, policymakers, administrators,
and health-care workers about the distribution and deter-
minants of health conditions. Further, they can (and
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should) guide and measure the impact of interventions
[1]. Public health surveillance – a subset of HIS – has been
defined as the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, and in-
terpretation of outcome-specific data for use in the planning,
implementation, and evaluation of public health practice[2].
Public health surveillance can be used to 1) assess the
overall health status of a population, 2) describe the nat-
ural history of disease, 3) monitor disease trends, 4) detect
epidemics, 5) evaluate the effect of prevention and control
measures, 6) generate hypotheses, and 7) facilitate epide-
miologic and laboratory research [3].
Before 1991, the Soviet Union centrally planned the infec-
tious diseases surveillance systems (IDSS) of its 15 repub-
lics. Approximately 300 million persons were covered
under the IDSS. Central monetary and technical support
for the IDSS ended in 1991. As a result, the republics have
struggled to maintain their respective IDSS. The former
Soviet Union (FSU)-wide diphtheria outbreak in the
1990s [4] and the re-emergence of malaria in Tadjikistan
in 1991 [5] and in Armenia [6] and Azerbaijan [7] in 1994
indicated that financial constraints resulting in the disrup-
tion of public health infrastructure and services had in-
creased the risk of the re-emergence of infectious diseases
[8].
After 1991, this transition to nationalism, privatization,
and social reorganization posed new challenges to each
republic of the FSU. The loss of centralized training, pub-
lic health expertise, and resources especially impacted the
surveillance systems in each republic. [9] Further, privati-
zation of the FSU medical systems resulted in under-budg-
eted public health services and inadequately paid
personnel [10]. Combined with these infrastructure prob-
lems, the increased population migration – both within
the FSU and internationally – contributed to morbidity
and mortality through population dislocation [8]. This
has increased the risk of exposure to re-emerging microbi-
al and environmental pathogens and limited access to
health services and good nutrition [9,10].
The most important of these changes was the financial cri-
ses resulting from the severance of economic ties among
all republics of the FSU. Public health officials were chal-
lenged to transform the bulky, state-sponsored IDSS. With
high inflation and unemployment, they also suffered
from shortages of vaccines, hospital supplies, and essen-
tial drugs. Provision of basic public health services were
compromised, including repairing antiquated water and
sewer systems, resulting in increased risk for gastroenteri-
tis and infections with hepatitis A [11]; the largest docu-
mented outbreak of typhoid in this century occurred in
Tajikistan in February 1997 [12]. Practices such as reusing
syringes during vaccination and poor sterilization proce-
dures during dentistry have contributed to nosocomial
outbreaks of HIV and a high prevalence of infections with
hepatitis B [13].
The objective of this work was to assess the current status
and functioning of various IDSS, so as to guide reform ef-
forts. At the invitation of seven Ministries of Health
(MoHs), we performed assessments in the Russian Feder-
ation and in the Republics of Kazakhstan, Tadjikistan, Uz-
bekistan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia, and in the Kyrgyz
Republic. We found striking homogeneity in comparing
the IDSS from one republic to another; and, for clarity, we
present here representative findings by using the Armeni-
an component of the IDSS (AIDSS) as a prototype.
Discussion
We used the CDC guidelines to assess the seven IDSS [14];
these guidelines have recently been republished in revised
form [15]. This strategy includes an assessment of public
health importance, objectives and usefulness, operation
of the system, cost, and the seven system attributes (i.e.,
simplicity, flexibility, acceptability, sensitivity, predictive
value positive, representativeness, and timeliness). The as-
sessment involves gathering both qualitative (i.e., simplic-
ity, flexibility, and acceptability) and observations of the
quantitative (i.e., sensitivity, predictive value positive,
representativeness, and timeliness) attributes.
In Armenia, we attempted to gather as much information
as possible with respect to the construct and utility of the
AIDSS from those most integral to its functioning and ap-
plication. Therefore, we conducted face-to-face interviews
and focus group discussions with approximately 50 epide-
miologists at the Ministry of Health, the National Sanitary
Epidemiologic Service, the Institute of Epidemiology, and
two regional, three districts, and one city Sanitary Epide-
miologic Service (SES) office. We also interviewed 23
health-care workers at village health centers, polyclinics,
hospitals, and laboratories, which serve as the primary re-
porting units for the AIDSS.
At the time of this assessment, the AIDSS was moving to-
ward reform, and we chose not to use the limited resourc-
es to gather quantitative data (e.g., through chart reviews)
to assess the quantitative attributes of the AIDSS (i.e., sen-
sitivity, predictive value positive, representativeness, and
timeliness). Rather, we relied on qualitative observations
gleaned in the course of the interviews. We present here
the qualitative observations made of the AIDSS and rec-
ommendations for reform. We believe these observations
and recommendations reflect the status of the IDSS of the
other FSU republics.
Description of the AIDSS
A republic of 3.3 million, Armenia gained its independ-
ence from the FSU on September 21, 1991 (Figure 1). TheBMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/3
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country is divided into 11 regions, which are subdivided
into 37 districts (Figure 2). Responsibility for the AIDSS
rests with the Department of Hygiene and Epidemiologic
Surveillance – a department of the Armenian MoH
(AMoH) – composed of 52 functional units known as the
Sanitary Epidemiologic Service (SES). The units or sta-
tions of the SES parallel the geopolitical divisions of Ar-
menia. There exists one SES station in each district. Each
city has one SES station, except Yerevan, the capital. Yer-
evan has eight districts, each with one SES station. The na-
tional SES is also located in Yerevan.
The SES, per se, developed from a model created in the late
1800s in russia and uniformly developed over many years
in the republics of the FSU. Its principle functions are to
collect and analyze public health surveillance data and to
implement and enforce strategies for the prevention and
control of infectious diseases. Traditionally, the SES had
approximately 10% of the entire medical person-power
and budget of the AMoH, and was separate from the cur-
ative medical care system [16,17]. The SES was staffed by
epidemiologists (physicians), microbiologists, sanitary
hygienists, and other health workers (paramedics and
physician assistants). The district SES was the basic public
health unit that monitored infectious diseases, investigat-
ed outbreaks, attended to child and adolescent health, in-
spected the food-service industry, monitored water purity,
and dealt with occupational and environmental health
problems throughout Armenia [6]. City-, regional-, and
national-level SES administrations were larger, with spe-
cialized staff.
The SES collected infectious diseases data from all health-
care facilities throughout the country. Before 1991, Arme-
nia had a comprehensive and free health-care delivery sys-
tem accessible to all citizens with health facilities and
health-care workers employed under the auspices of the
AMoH. Outpatient facilities (village health centers and
polyclinics) and hospitals reported to the AIDSS. Each dis-
trict had 12–45 village health centers, two polyclinics, and
one hospital. The seven cities in Armenia had variable
numbers of polyclinics and hospitals.
Altogether, Armenia had 830 village health centers, 228
polyclinics, and 179 hospitals (Figure 3). Data from these
health facilities were reported to the 52 districts and city
SES and then to the national SES, which forwarded aggre-
gated data to the Department of Hygiene and Epidemio-
logic Surveillance in the AMoH.
Objectives and Data Collection, Reporting, Analyses, and 
Response
The objectives of the AIDSS were to identify cases of infec-
tious diseases, document outbreaks, and monitor trends
in disease occurrence. It collected aggregated and case-
based data on new cases of 64 infectious diseases. This list
included some diseases with low pathogenicity (e.g., pe-
diculosis and scabies) and some diseases with inadequate
or non-existent preventive measures (e.g., infectious
mononucleosis and parapertussis). There existed no tiered
(e.g., confirmed, probable, and suspected) standardized
case definitions. The reporting of confirmed or suspected
cases of some infectious diseases required immediate re-
porting via telephone or in person within 12–24 hours.
These included epidemic prone diseases (e.g., diphtheria,
polio, plague).
Data were provided monthly and yearly from the district
to national SES. Reports from the national SES were sent
monthly to the AMoH and the other 14 republics of the
FSU and back to the district SES twice a year. The district
and city SES reported immediately to the national SES.
At all levels, epidemiologists used descriptive statistics for
data analyses. These included the calculation of aggregat-
ed case numbers and incidence and prevalence rates based
on estimates of the population size provided by the state
agency charged with gathering census data; limited strati-
fication by person, time, and place; and the assessment of
trends. Epidemiologists did not use analytic methods to
assess risk factors for diseases, even though they were col-
lected.
Cases and contacts of every disease were investigated by a
district or city SES epidemiologist within 24 hours of the
receipt of the case report, using a standardized form
known as the epid carta. This form was not disease specific,
yet lengthy (46 questions, many of which required subjec-
tive responses). Little or no feedback was provided to the
Figure 1
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original reporting sources and no routine or formal shar-
ing of data and information occurred between the district
SES and health-care facilities. Table 1 summarizes the
public health practice activities in Armenia, stratified by
health facility.
Qualitative Attributes
Simplicity
Referring to both its structure and ease of operation, the
AIDSS was complex. Epidemiologists gathered volumi-
nous information on each case; parallel vertical public
health programs reported duplicative information; much
time was required to collect, register, and report case in-
formation; and many staff maintained the system.
Flexibility and Acceptability
Addressing the extent to which the AIDSS could adapt to
changing information needs or operating conditions and
reflecting the willingness of participants to provide infor-
mation and monitor the system, the AMoH, itself, deter-
mined both its flexibility and acceptability. Because the
AMoH provided salaries for health-care personnel, it
could enforce compulsory reporting, through monetary
fines and professional demotions. Changes in reportable
conditions or criteria were made rapidly because adminis-
trative SES employees carried out orders quickly and com-
pletely at all levels in the system.
Quantitative Attributes
While we did not quantitatively measure the attributes of
sensitivity, predictive value positive, representativeness,
and timeliness, we did make qualitative observations.
Sensitivity
Assessing the AIDSS's ability to account for all incidents of
a disease (i.e., the proportion of cases detected, correctly
diagnosed, and reported), we learned that detection of
most reportable infectious conditions did come to medi-
cal attention. This was enhanced because all citizens re-
ceived free health care and because primary care
physicians were responsible for care (including communi-
ty outreach) of persons in their assigned territories. How-
ever, due to constrained resources, laboratory
confirmation of reportable infectious diseases was limited
in practice. As such, reporting was based on clinical or ep-
idemiologic, rather than laboratory information.
Predictive Value Positive
The likelihood that a disease report constituted a true case
of that disease was diminished because of the lack of lab-
oratory confirmation and standardized case definitions.
Representativeness
We felt that, ideally, the AIDSS accurately described the
distribution of diseases in the population by person, time,
and place because disease reporting was mandatory and
failure to report was a punishable offense. And, because of
the penalties, all official reporting to the national level did
occur on a monthly basis. However, it was common prac-
tice for epidemiologists to conceal cases of infectious dis-
ease and willfully underreport epidemic morbidity,
because outbreaks meant that the epidemiologists were
not performing their duties of preventing and controlling
infectious diseases. This paradox resulted in epidemiolo-
gists managing two sets of information: one officially re-
ported to higher-ups and one unofficially kept (with more
accurate numerators).
Timeliness
Information for action or for long-term planning was
available because mandatory reporting to the SES within
12–24 hours of diagnosis for most conditions under sur-
veillance allowed rapid implementation of control and
prevention measures.
Figure 2
The Sanitary Epidemiologic Stations (SES)
Figure 3
The flow of information, infectious diseases surveillance sys-
tem, Republic of Armenia, 1996
37 District SESs
37 Districts
6 City SESs
6 Cities
8 District SESs
Yerevan
(8 Districts)
7 Cities
National SES
Village Health Centers
830
Polyclinics
228
Hospitals
179
Raion/City SESs
52
National SES
Republic of Armenia
Ministry of HealthBMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/3
Page 5 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
Costs
Because budgets were relatively non-existent in the FSU,
historical data on the costs of operating the AIDSS were
not available. In the FSU centrally planned economy, re-
sources were obtained from cost centers (e.g., utilities
were not metered, office supplies were requested by quan-
tity and not cost, and salaries were provided from the cen-
tral budget). However, numerous observations led us to
conclude that the AIDSS was relatively inefficient and
costly; in large part, because the expenditure was paid
from the public sector.
The AIDSS was labor intensive. Being paper-driven, re-
porting dieases for which no practical public health inter-
ventions exist misallocated scarce resources. Other
common public health activities with high opportunity
cost in the AIDSS were indiscriminate disinfection of
homes and work sites. Environmental background moni-
toring practices by district and regional SES included rou-
tine collection of specimens and laboratory testing (e.g.,
air and water samples, food products, and items that chil-
dren may come in contact with such as toys or eating uten-
sils) in addition to evaluation of physical factors (noise,
vibration, microclimate, electromagnetic fields, levels of
lighting, and ionic radiation) at several sites (e.g., work
places and day-care centers).
When cases of hepatitis A, acute gastroenteritis, tuberculo-
sis, diphtheria, or pediculosis were reported, disinfection
of homes, schools, day-care centers and work places was
conducted by public health workers who used chloramine
application and steam cleaning of all hard surfaces and
laundering of all clothing and bedding materials. The ef-
fectiveness of such disinfection practices or environmen-
tal background monitoring has not been documented,
and is likely of doubtful public health utility.
During disease outbreaks, it was common practice to in-
vestigate every case and culture all available materials, and
decontamination efforts were instituted regardless of epi-
demiologic evidence. It was common practice to hospital-
ize children < 1 year of age with pneumonia for 7–14
days, and children of all ages with acute gastroenteritis for
7–15 days. It was also common to hospitalize both adults
and children with hepatitis A for 21 days, with syphilis for
two weeks, with gonorrhea for three weeks, and with tu-
berculosis for one year. These isolation practices, meant to
prevent disease transmission to the community, were con-
sequences of central planning in which emphasis was
placed on input indicators such as the occupancy rates of
hospitals. Incentives (budget allocations) placed on input
rather than output measures led to a level of medical in-
frastructure that has been difficult to maintain given cur-
rent levels of funding available for the health sector.
Because financial issues were a major driving factor, cost
analyses of surveillance practices and control measures
could identify areas for cost-savings. Analyses of the sur-
veillance system in Ukraine (using 1996 budget figures)
revealed that excessive culturing represented 47% of the
cost per capita expenditure of the L'viv Regional SES and
disinfection procedures accounted for almost 30% of the
entire Pustomity District SES's budget (V. Carande-Kulis,
CDC, personal communication).
Recommendations
Based on this assessment, we developed recommenda-
tions with respect to the three main surveillance functions
of data collection, analysis and interpretation, and retro-
spective and prospective responses.
Data Collection
• Eliminate punitive consequences to obtain accurate re-
porting;
Table 1: Public health surveillance and action core and support activities, by health level, Republic of Armenia, 1996
Organization Level Public Health Surveillance and Action Core and Support Activity
Detection Registration Confirmation
(Epidemiologic
and
Laboratory)
Reporting/
Feedback
Analyses Acute
 (Outbreak-
Type)
Response
Planned
(Management-
Type)
Response
Communication Training Supervision Resource-
Provision
Primary Health Facilities X X X X X X X X X X
District SES X X X X X X X
District Lab X X X X X X X X
District Lab X X X X X X X
Regional SES X X X X X X X
Regional Lab X X X X X
National SES X X X X
National Lab X X X XBMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/3
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• Restrict the number of routinely reportable diseases
based on measures of mortality, morbidity, severity, com-
municability, and preventability;
• Categorize events under surveillance into a three-tiered
surveillance system:
 disease elimination (e.g., polio);
 case-based (e.g., diphtheria); and
 indicator-based (e.g., number of children immunized
by two years of age);
• Simplify reporting procedures and forms by
 limiting urgent reporting of diseases to those that re-
quire prompt institution of control measures;
 requiring only information necessary to direct control
measures and perform basic analyses; and
 developing disease-specific forms with diseases chosen
for case-based surveillance;
• Develop tiered (confirmed, probable, and suspected)
standardized case definitions for all events under surveil-
lance; and
• Computerize demographic and risk-factor data for sys-
tematic and detailed analysis of reported diseases and rap-
id dissemination of information.
Analysis and Interpretation
• Provide ongoing capacity for training in analytic epide-
miology; and
• Base interventions on epidemiologic evidence. Use ana-
lytic epidemiology (case-control and cohort studies and
presentation of data using 2 ×  2 tables, odds ratios, rela-
tive risks, and tests of significance) for hypothesis genera-
tion, risk factor identification, outbreak investigations
and intervention design and monitoring.
Retrospective and Prospective Responses
• Provide feedback to all reporting sources and share in-
formation across vertical program lines and with officials
throughout the public health community in a timely fash-
ion (e.g., via a monthly public health bulletin). A bulletin
could include descriptions of important outbreak investi-
gations, disease-specific analyses of surveillance data,
graphic and tabular information on selected diseases, in-
dicators of community health, and recommendations for
public health concerns.
Current HIS Reform Efforts in Armenia
This assessment stimulated and guided reform efforts that
were initiated in December 1992 through a cooperative
project among the AMoH, United States Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), and CDC. This project
provided technical and material assistance toward reform
of the Armenian HIS. The approach focused on training a
cohort of public health officials and epidemiologists in
the modern aspects of epidemiology, biostatistics, surveil-
lance techniques, and scientific communications; devel-
oping Armenia-specific case definitions; facilitating HIS
reform strategies through workshops and training ses-
sions; and developing the capacity to publish an epidemi-
ologic bulletin.
Since 1996, this HIS reform activity has been self-sus-
tained with no additional monetary support from USAID
[6]. In 1996, the AMoH created a national HIS program
for the development and reform of the HIS and the Arme-
nian National Health Analytic-Information Centre [18].
The system has been transformed into a comprehensive
HIS and includes chronic diseases, maternal and child
health, and injury data. Diseases are now categorized by a
three-tiered approach: disease elimination (e.g., polio),
case-based (e.g., diphtheria) and indicator-based (e.g.,
number of children immunized by two years of age).
Preparations are now being made for additional training
and to assess and improve clinic case diagnoses, manage-
ment, and recording, and clinic records. New regional
centers equipped with computers and faxes have been or-
ganized for the collection, analyses, and reporting of
health information. National and regional public health
bulletins are being published monthly in three languages
- Armenian, Russian and English – and distributed to wide
audiences. Tiered, standardized case definitions and es-
sential health indicators for decision-making at the clinic
and community level have been developed and dissemi-
nated. These include health status, performance, and re-
source indicators.
Comprehensive HIS reform is critical throughout the FSU.
Timely, accurate, and relevant health information are nec-
essary to assess the burden of disease and disability; un-
derstand changing health patterns; measure the needs for
and improve services; address inequities in health; pro-
vide information for policy formulation and planning;
and provide a basis for intra- and international compari-
sons on health status and care utilization [1]. Timeliness,
accuracy, and relevancy are augmented by efficiency. Inte-
grating all sources of data into one comprehensive HIS
prevents duplicate recording and reporting across services
and programs, averts labor-wasting inefficiencies, and
saves scarce resources.BMC Public Health 2002, 2 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/2/3
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A comprehensive HIS includes the capacity to obtain data
from vital registries, clinical, administrative, and other
records; from provider and population-based surveys and
sentinel systems for infectious and chronic diseases, and
disabilities; and maternal and child health, nutrition, and
program implementation indicators, including access,
coverage, and service quality [1]. This reform activity
should include the development of an indicator monitor-
ing system based on selected essential, action-oriented in-
dicators of health status, service performance, and
resources that can be used for decision-making at the local
level.
Summary
We found the AIDSS to be a complex and sensitive, yet
costly and inefficient surveillance system for infectious
diseases. Despite the lack of standardized case definitions,
feedback of information, and computer technology, it
functioned fairly well before 1991. However, the func-
tioning and continuation of the AIDSS has been affected
both directly and indirectly by events of the past decade.
Overall, the former AIDSS was useful because it detected
cases of infectious diseases, estimated morbidity, moni-
tored trends in disease occurrence, and documented out-
breaks. The comprehensive no-cost health-care delivery
system and compulsory reporting of diseases to the AMoH
enhanced its flexibility, representativeness, and timeli-
ness. The strengths of the AIDSS stemmed from the large
numbers of health facilities and trained personnel and the
separation of preventive from curative medicine, that se-
cured an independent status (including separate budget)
for preventive medicine and public health practitioners.
The AIDSS also had weaknesses. Though the system me-
ticulously tracked persons (from birth to death), very few
of these data were computerized, analyzed, or used to de-
velop, direct, or evaluate public health policy. In most cas-
es, when used, data guided regulation and punishment
rather than public health decision-making. Simply put,
data were used to fix blame and punish rather than to find
and implement effective interventions.
Epidemiologists were motivated to perform actions that
both pleased their supervisors and avoided the punish-
ment of monetary loss or demotion. For example, it was
common practice for epidemiologists to hide select cases
of infectious disease and willfully underreport epidemic
morbidity because outbreaks meant that the epidemiolo-
gists were not performing their duties of preventing and
controlling infectious diseases. These disincentives to
thoroughness and honesty resulted in surveillance data
and reports that did not reflect true incidence and preva-
lence of disease, circumstances, needs, responses, or im-
pacts [9].
Because the AIDSS was but a component of the systems
designed for the entire FSU, the AIDSS did not address Ar-
menia-specific needs. Further, because of the lack of
tiered, standardized case definitions, there existed a po-
tential for misclassification of diseases. Lack of feedback
to reporting sources hampered improvements in clinical
practice. Monitoring conditions for which there were no
practical public health interventions, the multi-tiered and
duplicative reporting processes, and the use of expensive
and indirect monitoring and control measures such as ex-
cessive culturing, disinfection, and prolonged hospitaliza-
tion led to waste of resources. As a result, the system did
not guide control measures optimally nor use resources
efficiently.
As the republics of the FSU embrace various aspects of de-
mocratization, improvement of public health surveillance
systems such as the IDSS should be a goal if decision mak-
ers are to use credible data for informed public health
practice.
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